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Abstract 
This paper reviews and extends a new framework, developed by Razin, Sadka, and 
Swagel, for capturing the effect of population ageing on public support for government 
social expenditures.  Razin et al construct up an overlapping generations, median voter 
model, and investigate the empirical applicability of the model using panel data from 13 
OECD countries.  Their results suggest that population ageing will put downward pressure 
on per capita expenditures.  These results rest, however, on an assumption that there is 
only one dependant age group: the old.  This paper investigates the consequences of 
allowing for two such age groups: the young and the old.  A replication of Razin et al’s 
empirical analysis, using two dependent age groups rather than one, suggests that 
population ageing will instead put upward pressure on per capita expenditures.  Although 
these results are tentative, they illustrate the usefulness of including both youth 
dependency and old-age dependency in Razin et al’s framework. 
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Modelling the effect of population 
ageing on government social 
expenditures 
1 Introduction 
Designing prudent fiscal policy that treats successive generations equitably requires 
estimates of how population ageing will affect government social expenditures.  One way 
to derive estimates is to start with age-specific expenditure levels and calculate how 
overall expenditure levels vary in response to changing age structures.  Substantial 
progress has been made in this area (Creedy 2002, Dang, Antolin and Oxley 2001, Foote 
and Spoor 2001, Woods 2000).  A complementary approach is to examine the effect on 
the policy process of increases in the population share of older people.  The conventional 
view is that an increase in the number of older voters will create strong pressures for 
increased social spending. 
Razin, Sakda, and Swagel (2002) cast doubt on this view.  Razin et al present a model of 
how changes in dependency rates affect social expenditures via their effect on the 
interests of the median voter.  They show that, under some parameter settings, an 
increase in dependency rates can lead to a decline in per capita social expenditures.  
They also present results from a regression analysis, based on panel data for the United 
States and 12 European countries, suggesting that per capita social expenditures are 
indeed negatively correlated with dependency levels. 
This paper argues, however, that Razin et al’s approach needs to be extended to allow 
slightly more demographic detail. Neither Razin et al’s model nor their empirics distinguish 
between old-age dependency and youth dependency.  As with many overlapping 
generations models, the model contains only two age groups: young workers and old 
dependants.  Razin et al’s empirical analysis carries over the use of one working and one 
dependent group, with the dependent group including both young and old. 
Using data supplied by Razin et al, I have repeated their empirical analysis, but with 
dependency disaggregated into youth and old-age components. The revised analysis 
suggests that taxes and transfers are negatively correlated with youth dependency but 
positively correlated with old-age dependency.  This finding can be reconciled with an 
extended version of Razin et al’s theoretical model. 
The first two sections of this paper describe Razin et al’s theoretical model and empirical 
results.  The third section describes a new analysis.  The final section discusses the 
implications.  
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2 Razin  et al’s theoretical model 
Razin et al construct a median voter model with overlapping generations.  This section 
sketches out features of the model that are relevant to the extension and reanalysis 
described below.  There are two generations: young workers and old dependants.  The 
young are assumed to outnumber the old.  The only tax is a labour tax, which is 
proportional to labour income.
1
  The budget is balanced in every period, and the entire tax 
revenue is spent on benefit payments.  Everyone, young or old, receives the same 
payment.  People care only about their own income. 
Young people face the decision of whether or not to acquire an education.  Workers with 
an education have higher productivity and earn a higher wage than workers without an 
education.  However, acquiring an education takes time, and has an opportunity cost in 
forgone wages.  Young workers vary in their innate ability.  The greater a person’s innate 
ability, the more quickly the person can complete an education, and the lower the 
education’s opportunity cost.  All those whose ability is greater than a certain level acquire 
an education, while none of those whose ability is lower than this level acquire an 
education.  The location of the cut-off point depends on taxes, wages, the pecuniary cost 
of education, and the extent to which education improves productivity.  The lifetime 
incomes of the educated vary, depending on their innate ability and hence the time spent 
in the workforce.  The lifetime incomes of the uneducated are identical. 
As with standard median voter models, taxes and benefits are at their equilibrium level 
when the income that the median voter would gain through an increase in benefits exactly 
equals the income that he or she would lose through the corresponding increases in 
taxes.  No other combination of taxes and benefits is politically sustainable.  Suppose, for 
instance, that the median voter would gain more from a small increase in benefits than he 
or she would loose through the corresponding increase in taxes.  The median voter would 
join a pro-benefits coalition, which would then have a majority, and the new regime of 
benefits and taxes could be voted in. 
Old people pay no taxes, and are therefore always in favour of raising taxes and benefits.  
Young people are divided into pro-benefit and anti-benefit groups.  Young people who do 
not acquire an education are either all pro-benefit or all anti-benefit, since they all receive 
the same income.  Young people who do acquire an education are, in general, divided 
into pro-benefit and anti-benefit groups.  The greater the educated young person’s ability, 
and hence the higher their income, the more anti-benefit they are.  The fact that young 
people can be ranked from most anti-benefit to most pro-benefit according to their innate 
ability keeps the analysis of coalition formation relatively simple.  The identity of the 
median voter, and hence the equilibrium level of taxes and benefits, depends ultimately on 
the ratio of old to young, and on the distribution of innate ability among the young. 
An increase in the ratio of old to young has opposing effects on the level of taxes and 
benefits.  All the extra old people favour increasing tax and benefit levels.  The rise in the 
number of dependants per taxpayer means, however, that a smaller proportion of any 
taxes paid are returned to taxpayers in the form of benefits; Razin et al describe this as an 
increase in ‘fiscal leakage’.  Increased taxes also lower pre-tax incomes by discouraging 
some young people from undertaking productivity-enhancing education. The first effect 
makes it more likely that the median voter will favour higher taxes and benefits, while the 
                                                                 
1
 Razin, Sadka, and Swagel (2001b) use a different model with a tax on capital. 
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second and third effects makes it less likely.  The balance between these effects, and 
hence the new level of taxes and benefits, depends on the ratio of old to young, and on 
the distribution of innate ability among  the young. 
3 Razin  et al’s empirical results 
Razin et al’s empirical analysis is designed to test which effects dominate in practice.  The 
data come from 12 European countries
2
 and the United States, over the period 1965-
1992.  They carry out an Ordinary Least Squares regression, with country-specific fixed 
effects.  Because data are not available for all countries in all years, the panel is 
unbalanced. Two different dependent variable are used.  The first is the ‘labour tax rate’, 
which uses ‘revenue statistics to calculate an average tax rate on labor income’ (Razin et 
al 2002: 912),  and was assembled by Razin et al based on a method set out in Mendoza, 
Razin, and Tesar (1994).  The second dependent variable is (the log of) benefits per 
capita.  These are also calculated by Razin et al from OECD data, and include 
unemployment and disability benefits, though they are dominated by payments to the 
aged.  The independent variable of interest is the ‘dependency ratio’, which Razin et al 
define as one minus the proportion of the population in the labour force.
3
   
Razin et al include a number of control variables, based on previous studies of the size of 
the welfare state.  These variables are shown in Table 1.  Trade openness is measured by 
imports and exports as a percentage of GDP.  Income inequality is measured by the share 
of total income received by the top quintile divided by the share received by the middle 
quintile.  The other variables are self-explanatory.  All data come from the OECD 
analytical database, apart from the data on income shares, which come from the World 
Bank’s inequality database. Summary statistics for the variables are presented in Razin, 
Sadka and Swagel (2001a: Table 1). 
As can be seen from the estimated coefficients on the dependency ratio in Table 1, Razin 
et al find that increased dependency rates are associated with reduced taxation and 
benefits.  Within the framework of their model, this suggests that the fiscal leakage and 
education-reducing effects have outweighed the voting power effect. 
                                                                 
2 The 12 countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, the 
United Kingdom. 
3 Razin et al’s definition is somewhat different from the usual definition in the literature on population ageing, though perhaps more 
economically meaningful.  The usual definition is the number of people outside the working ages divided by the number in the working 
ages.  
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Table 1 - Determinants of labour tax rate and benefits per capita in Razin et al’s 
original specification 
  Labour tax rate    (Log of) benefits per 
capita 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
























































N  330  330  330  330 
R2  0.753  0.793  0.617  0.618 
Note – All specifications include fixed effects (coefficients not shown.)  The value for R2 does not include the contribution of the fixed 
effects. The numbers in brackets are t-statistics. 
Source – Razin et al (2002: Table 1)  
4 A  reanalysis 
Razin  et al’s model makes some obviously unrealistic assumptions, such as the 
assumption that benefit payments are the same for everyone.  Razin et al (p911) also 
caution that their empirical results should be seen merely as ‘suggestive’ and ‘broadly 
consistent with the main implications of the theory’.  They note (p915) that further 
statistical analysis is needed, such as the use of instrumental variables to deal with the 
possibility of reverse causation. 
Both the unrealistic assumptions and the limited statistical testing are readily defensible.   
Razin  et al’s work is an early exploration of a difficult topic. Moreover, much of the 
heuristic value of  Razin et al’s model is due to its simplicity, which inevitably requires the 
sacrifice of some realism.  Little is therefore gained from merely pointing out counter-
examples to the assumptions or potential limitations in the statistical analysis.  What is 
useful, however, is the identification of areas where substantively important extensions 
can be added to model without unduly complicating it.  That is the aim of this section. 
Razin et al’s theoretical model and statistical analysis both recognize only one sort of 
dependant.  A straightforward extension of Razin et al’s framework suggests, however, 
that the effect on equilibrium taxes and benefits of increasing the number of young 
dependants may well be different from the effect of increasing the number of old 
dependants.  The exact effects depend on whether benefit payments to children are 
treated as if they were payments to the children’s parents.  
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The analysis is simpler when benefit payments are treated as if they were not payments to 
the parents.  In this case, a rise in the number of young dependants parallels a rise in the 
number of old dependants, in that it unambiguously increases the extent of the ‘fiscal 
leakage’ and discouragement of education.  However, because young people, unlike old 
people, cannot vote, a rise in their number adds no one to the pro-tax coalition.  In sum, a 
rise in youth dependency, unlike a rise in old age dependency, does not have a voting 
power effect to offset the fiscal leakage and education effects.  Youth dependency, unlike 
old age dependency, is unambiguously predicted to be negatively correlated with benefit 
levels. 
The analysis is different, however, if some or all of the benefits paid to children are treated 
as if they were paid to the children’s parents.  In this case, working age parents see the 
tax and transfer system as having less fiscal leakage than do working age non-parents.  A 
rise in the number of young dependants may add to or subtract from the pro-tax coalition, 
depending on how childbearing and innate ability are distributed among the working age 
population.  Without knowledge of these distributions, the framework cannot be used to 
make unconditional predictions about whether youth dependency will be negatively or 
positively correlated with benefits levels. 
The remainder of this section examines the empirical evidence.  The first step is to 
disaggregate Razin et al’s original dependency ratio (defined as one minus the labour 
force participation rate).  Equation 1 shows one way of doing so.  This decomposition 
ignores labour force participation by people aged 65 and over; the rationale for doing so is 
that participation rates at these ages are typically under 10%, and treating them as zero 
simplifies the analysis to follow.  To maintain comparability with Razin et al’s original 
analysis, the decomposition includes working age people not in the labour force, though 
the main focus is on old and young dependants.  The numbers in brackets underneath 
Equation 1 are the means during the period 1965-1992 across the 13 countries included 
in Razin et al’s original regression.  As is apparent, the third term on the right, 
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(0.56)   (0.22)    (0.21)    (0.13)   
 
As Table 2 shows, the old-age dependency ratio is negatively correlated with the 
combined ratio over the period 1965-1992. The combined dependency ratio did, as Razin 
et al point out, fall between 1965 and 1992.  The old-age dependency ratio, however, 
rose. 
Table 3 shows the results of repeating  Razin et al’s (2002: Table 1) original fixed effects 
panel regression, replacing the combined dependency ratio with three separate 
dependency measures. For Specifications (3) and (6), which required more observations 
for growth in GDP per capita than were available in Razin et al’s dataset, growth rates 
were calculated from the Laspeyres Index GDP per capita series in the Penn World 
Tables (Heston, Summers and Aten 2002).  Specifications (1), (2), (4), and (5) cover 
1965-1992, the same period as used by Razin et al.  Specification (3) covers the period  
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1965-1996, and Specification (6), 1960-1996.  For all periods, some countries have 
missing observation, so the panel is unbalanced. 
Table 2 - Correlation matrix for the components of the dependency ratio, for the 13 
country sample, 1965-1992 
 Aged  0-14 
Aged 15-64, not in
labour force  Aged 65+  Combined ratio 
Aged  0-14  1.00 0.14  -0.75 0.49 
Aged 15-64, not in labour force  0.14  1.00  -0.46  0.91 
Aged  65+  -0.75 -0.46  1.00 -0.53 
Combined  ratio  0.49 0.91  -0.53 1.00 
Source - Calculated from data supplied by Razin et al and data from the OECD labour statistics online database. 
At first sight, an attractive way of disaggregating the combined dependency ratio is to use 
the three age-specific measures set out in Equation 1. This is what Specifications (1) and 
(4) in Table 3 do.  Interpretation of Specifications (1) and (4) is, however, made difficult by 
the presence of the term for working-age dependency.  This term is the product of two 
different things: the proportion of the 15-64 age group not in the labour force, and the 
proportion of the total population in the 15-64 age group. Moreover, the proportion in the 
15-64 age group is perfectly (negatively) correlated with sum of the youth and old-age 
dependency ratios. 
Specifications (2) and (5) replace the working-age dependency term with the labour force 
participation rate.  The terms capturing dependency now all have clear interpretations. 
The term for the proportion of the population aged 0-14 shows the effect of holding both 
labour force participation and the proportion aged 65 and over constant, and increasing 
the proportion of the population aged 0-14 at the expense of the proportion aged 15-64.  
The term for the proportion aged 65 and over has an analogous interpretation. The term 
for labour force participation shows the effect of increasing participation while holding age 
structure constant. Specifications (3) and (6) are identical to Specifications (2) and (5), 
except that longer time periods have been used.  
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Table 3 - Determinants of labour tax rate and benefits per capita 
  Labour tax rate    (Log of) benefits per capita 
  (1) (2) (3)    (4) (5) (6) 
Proportion of population aged 0-14  -0.306     
(-2.54) 
-0.410     
(-3.53) 
-0.399     
(-3.50) 
  -9.730     
(-8.57) 
-9.834     
(-8.98) 
-8.045    
(-8.56) 
Proportion of population aged 15-64 
and not in the labour  force 
0.318 
(2.37)    
 0.278 
(0.22)    
Labour force participation rate, ages 
15-64   
-0.194     
(-2.19) 












































Per capita GDP growth  -0.125     
(-2.19) 
-0.123     
(-2.16) 
-0.143     
(-2.38) 
  -2.775     
(-5.15) 
-2.775     
(-5.15) 
-2.473    
(-4.56) 
Rich / middle income share  -0.009     
(-0.50) 
















  -4.038     
(-5.48) 
-4.078     
(-5.54) 
-3.999    
(-6.93) 
Period*  1965-92 1965-92 1965-96    1965-92 1965-92 1960-96 
N  330 330 349    330 330 441 
R2  0.815 0.815 0.827    0.681 0.681 0.774 
*Shorter periods are used for countries with missing data. 
Notes – All specifications include fixed effects (coefficients not shown).  Values for R2 do not include the contribution of the fixed effects 
(these values were calculated by subtracting country-specific means from all dependent and independent variables before 
conducting the analysis).   The numbers in brackets are t-statistics. 
 
The results for Specifications (2) and (3) show that, all else equal, higher population 
shares for ages 0-14 at the expense of ages 15-64 are associated with lower levels of 
taxes on labour income.  Conversely, higher population shares for  ages 65 and over are 
associated with higher taxes.  Neither of these results is sensitive to the choice of period. 
The results for Specifications (5) and (6) show that higher population shares for ages 0-14 
are associated with reductions in benefits per capita.  The relationship between old-age 
dependency and benefits per capita is unclear.  If the period 1965-1992 is used, the 
relationship is positive but not statistically significant at the 5% level; if the period 1960-
1996 is used, the relationship is positive and statistically significant.  The overall finding is 
that more young people implies lower taxes and lower benefits, while more old people 
implies higher taxes and, possibly, higher benefits. 
Specifications (2) and (3) show that, holding age structure constant, higher labour force 
participation is associated with lower taxes.  This result should be treated with caution, 
however, as there is likely to be reverse causality from taxes to participation.  No clear 
relationship between benefit levels and labour force participation is apparent from 
Specifications (5) and (6).  
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5 Conclusion 
Forecasting future trends in government social expenditures requires a model of how 
expenditure trends emerge from the policy process.  Razin et al (2002) have recently 
made significant progress towards this objective.  Their work is notable partly for its 
theoretical innovations and partly because the conclusions are contrary to the 
conventional wisdom.  Whereas many commentators assume that rises in the number of 
older voters must put upward pressure on expenditures per capita, Razin et al draw 
attention to the offsetting effect of increased fiscal leakage and distortion of investment 
decisions.  Their statistical analysis, which they warn is only preliminary, suggests that the 
fiscal leakage and distortion effects have been outweighing the voting power effect in their 
panel of 13 OECD countries, so that population ageing has been creating downward 
pressures on per capita expenditures. 
This paper has argued, however, that the balance between the pro-benefit and anti-
benefit effects is likely to be different for young dependants than for old dependants.  This 
suggests that extending Razin et al’s framework to include young dependants as well as 
old ones would be productive.  Repeating Razin et al’s statistical with a disaggregated 
dependency ratio indicates that changes in old-age dependency and youth dependency 
do indeed have different effects on taxes and benefits.   Youth dependency seems to be 
negatively correlated with tax and benefit levels, while old-age dependency seems to be 
positively correlated with taxes and (possibly) benefits. 
All the same caveats that Razin et al apply to their statistical analysis also apply to the 
analysis presented here.  However, the results presented here demonstrate the value of 
distinguishing between broad age groups when modelling the effects of population ageing 
on the policy process.  The results also imply an opposite prediction about the future size 
of the welfare state to the one made by Razin et al (2002: 917).  Based on the finding that 
taxes and benefits are negatively correlated with the combined dependency ratio, Razin et 
al suggest that the rising dependency ratio associated with population aging may exert 
downward pressure on taxes and benefits.  The analysis presented here suggests that 
falling youth dependency and rising old-age dependency both put upward pressure on 
taxes and benefits.  Falling youth dependency and rising old-age dependency are exactly 
what current population projections envisage for coming decades. 
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